"… [The] accountancy profession in the United Kingdom was born in the context of government regulation of an intervention in the economy, and has continued to flourish in that context. Difficulties associated with the administration of the bankruptcy laws of the State provided a powerful incentive for the formation of a professional institute. Thereafter the profession developed in the context of a market for audit services that was to become legally required, and eventually gained a legal monopoly in its provision. … So much of the work of professional accountants resides within the interstices of State interventionist policies, not only in areas such as taxation and corporate restructuring, but also in their capacity as applied economic consultants, specialists in compilation of economic data and intelligence.
Even though it is difficult to understand the contemporary significance of the accountancy profession in the United Kingdom without appreciating its mutual intertwining with the modern conception of the State, the profession itself has adopted a most entrepreneurial stance. It has repeatedly done what it has not done before …" (Hopwood, 1985: 13-14) .
The intertwined relationships between accounting, accountancy bodies, accounting firms and the state 1 have been an under-explored theme in the accounting literature. Accounting calculations play a major part in levying taxes, regulating property rights, managing wars, promoting financial discipline in the public sector and even persuading private capital to provide a particular kind of public accountability. The state has long used accounting calculations to manage and displace recurring crises of capitalism. It has even been suggested that "how the concept of capitalism was invented is an example of the influence of accounting ideas …" (Chiapello, 2007: 264) . In short, accounting is central to capitalism as a mode of production that, in its advanced form, exists in a mutually dependent and antagonistic relationship to the state, as a medium and outcome of the formation and reproduction of capitalism. 1 The state is best understood as an ensemble of institutional structures that have co-evolved with the contradictory pressures and demands of a capitalist economy. The government, courts, the church, law enforcement agencies and professional associations are examples of such institutional structures (Gramsci, 1971 ).
There is a complex and contradictory relationship between the state and the accounting industry. In the UK context, accountants have successfully mobilized powers of the state to secure markets, niches and monopolies to earn economic rents. Often the state has been instrumental in (re)formulating accounting and auditing regulation and preserving forms of self-regulation (Sikka, Willmott and Lowe, 1989) . The state has used the services of accounting firms to restructure the public sector and privatize many industries.
This seems to have coincided with a reluctance to expose major accounting firms to public scrutiny. For example, the state has suppressed critical reports and demonstrated unwillingness to investigate anti-social practices (Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Mitchell, Sikka and Willmott, 1998) . Exceptionally, when the activities of accounting firms have threatened tax revenues and with it the operations of the state's machinery, the state has occasionally investigated and prosecuted major accounting firms (Sikka, 2008a) .
Globalization has added new complexities to the relationship between the state and capital. Whilst the state is primarily confined to a defined geographical jurisdiction, capital is free to roam the world and shop for possibilities of lower costs, regulation and liabilities. Major corporations have often been able to persuade smaller states to enact desirable legislation. In turn, corporations have used this as a lever to squeeze concessions from larger states and reconfigure the economic and regulatory environment (Hampton and Abbott, 1999; Palan, 2002) . Such strategies are dependent upon the availability of political and financial resources and accounting firms seem to have considerable supply of both, especially as accounting firms are a significant fraction capital and the UK state has on occasion sought competitive advantage for local firms by refusing to co-operate with regulators from other countries (Arnold and Sikka, 2001 which offer lighter regulation, low/no tax and confidentiality. In providing a haven for capital, OFCs have rapidly grown in importance to become a "cornerstone of the process of globalization" (Palan et al., 1996: 180) 
STATE, CAPITAL AND GLOBALIZATION
There are wide-ranging debates about the nature and concept of the state (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Jessop, 1990 Jessop, , 2002 . Here we follow the assessment that "the meaning of the state has shifted dramatically over the last thirty years and that the main forcing agent in that shift has been something called 'globalization' (whatever that may mean)" (Harvey, 2006, p. xvii) . Whilst the significance and extent of globalization is contested by scholars (for a discussion see Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Stiglitz, 2002; Bhagwati, 2004; Saul, 2005) , there is considerable agreement over its association with the accelerating mobility of goods, services, capital, commodities, information and communications across national frontiers (Robinson, 2004) . Such mobility has been promoted by a particular, neoliberal hegemony that prioritizes market-driven competition as the preferred mechanism of resource generation and allocation while admitting a subsidiary role for the state in supporting an infrastructure geared to supporting this priority (Harvey, 2000) . A neoliberal order is not, then, one in which the state is entirely hollowed out (the aspiration of laissez faire liberalism). Rather, it is an order in which allocation through the market is systematically privileged, as manifest in forms of privatization and deregulation. (Elliott and Atkinson, 2008) .
The activities of the neoliberal state are dedicated primarily to stabilizing, enhancing the politico-economic context of business activity through a variety of and, ultimately rescuing de/regulatory and, when required, salvationary mechanisms.
Such mechanisms do not rely, in the first instance, upon naked coercion but instead depend upon processes of moral and cultural leadership provided by the institutions of civil society (Gramsci, 1971) , notably education and the media and extending to the legitimating expertise provided by inter alia accounting firms. That is to say, the neoliberal project requires (popular) legitimation from below in the form of, for example, a rising material standard of living, a sense of increasing personal wealth or, most recently, an understanding that opposition to bailing out the banks with public funds would be most disadvantageous to the very people -the ordinary taxpayer -who will pay for the funding with higher taxes and/or a deterioration in public services. The project of neo-liberalism is however, endemically problematic as the state faces competing demands from constituent elements of civil society as well as from fractions of capital. Faced with numerous, contradictory pressures, responses are politically expedient rather than rationally consistent. So, on occasion, pressures from some fractions of capital (e.g. to allow markets to eliminate the weak and to avoid 'moral hazards') may be resisted in preference for policies aimed at increasing public confidence in capitalism (e.g. to place failed banks, such as Northern Rock, in public ownership).
We stressed earlier how nation states increasingly form part of an interdependent global system of states. Some commentators have argued that the contemporary neoliberal celebration of free trade, intensification of competition, lowering of trade barriers, removal of exchange controls and the accompanying increase in flows of capital and density of corporate networks heralds a slow death of the nation state (Ohmae, 1995) . Yet, even in processes of globalization, states remain key actors. Attentive to the constraints of domestic politics and institutional structures, states co-operate politically and economically. Their coalition may reconstruct sovereignty but it is also intended to protect or increase their capacity to secure local capital and attract mobile capital. Forms of economic and political cooperation between otherwise antagonistic states are designed to create an environment conducive to the welfare of capital and thereby to finance the continuing supply of social order and basic public goods. Of course, these outcomes cannot be guaranteed as corporations have "no intrinsic commitment to product, to place, to country, or to type of economic activity. The commitment is to the accumulation of capital.
Therefore, the capitalist will shift locus of economic engagement (product, place, country, type of activity) as shifts occur in the opportunities to maximize revenues from undertaking" (Wallerstein, 1996: 89) . Nonetheless, states collectively, as well as individually, are engaged in securing and enhancing the conditions (e.g. permissive company law and labour legislation) that improve the prospects of retaining or attracting capital investment as a condition of possibility of sustaining the economic activity that funds public goods.
One key way in which the mobility of capital is facilitated and accelerated is through policies that enable business vehicles to enjoy a relative freedom of incorporation. Such vehicles can originate in one country, but be used to trade in others. Businesses can also own vehicles in other countries and collaborate with local networks to develop profitable opportunities. This enhanced capacity to exit, with the threat of economic turbulence that accompanies it,
gives corporations considerable direct and indirect influence over government policies as the prospect of possible capital flight or strikes is factored into the policy-making process. Of most relevance for the present chapter, the increased mobility and associated leverage of capital on governments has been assisted by policies pursued by OFCs.
Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs)
By the late 1990s, OFCs were estimated to hold about 50% of all cross-border assets (International Monetary Fund, 2000) . Almost one-third of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and half of global monetary stock passed through them at some stage (Oxfam, 2000) . OFCs have often been established in micro, often small islands, states occupying a peripheral position in global markets. Lacking significant natural, human, diplomatic or military resources to develop their economies, such micro states have opted to specialize in developing a low-tax, lightly regulated jurisdictions for inter alia registering companies and investing in offshore funds. Historically, these states have relied upon such industries as agriculture and tourism but these sources of income are difficult to sustain in the face of competition from low-wage developing countries. When low growth and incomes failed to meet the economic aspirations of their citizens, the response by a number of micro states has been to mobilize the asset of sovereignty with its lawmaking powers to charge rents for sheltering capital in a haven of anonymity, low taxes and light regulation (Hampton and Abbott, 1999; Donaghy and Clarke, 2003 ).
Key to the success of OFCs has been the development of policies allowing non-residents to escape regulation. This has provoked the accusation that
OFCs "auction off their sovereignty to the highest bidder, reaping great rewards in the process …" (Drezner, 2001: 76-77) and enact "laws with the sole purpose of getting around the laws of other countries [and] sell their sovereignty and their law to the highest bidder" (The Guardian, 2 May, 2000).
In larger, established states, the neoliberal pressures to erode or sell off sovereignty (e.g. deregulation) in an effort to entice or retain capital can be somewhat mitigated by civil pressures to incorporate consideration of other constituencies (e.g. trades unions, the consumers of public services). In contrast, in OFCs such countervailing pressures are often weak, even to the point that key beneficiaries of changes in the law are permitted to draft laws with little public scrutiny (Naylor, 1987) .
The legal facilities offered by OFCs are designed to be attractive to capital. In integrated world markets, businesses do not have to uproot and relocate their entire operations because most countries have accepted the principle that "legal persons could reside concomitantly in a number of jurisdictions (Palan, 2002: 72) ". Once established, this principle has created "the risk that they would go shopping for the best bundles of regulation they could find" (ibid).
Shopping for the best regulation deal is facilitated by networks of lawyers and business advisers who specialize in legally permissible ways of avoiding regulation (McCahery and Picciotto, 1995) . Many businesses have improved and extended their regulatory options by establishing or renting residences in
OFCs so as to take advantage of the diverse legal choices on offer.
Needless to say, regulatory arbitrage has the capacity to undermine and destabilize the regulatory regimes developed by other states which find themselves under intensified pressures to offer regulatory concessions in order to retain capital within their jurisdiction. In the following section, we illustrate this phenomenon by reference to the politics of auditor liability arrangements. Accounting firms in the UK have historically relied upon the state to secure liability concessions. With the intensification of globalization and the opportunities that it presents, the possibility of transferring activities to an alternative jurisdiction, in the form of an OFC, has provided an additional, potent weapon to the arsenal of accounting firms seeking to minimize their liabilities.
STATE AND ACCOUNTING FIRMS
Our analysis of the pressure exerted upon UK state regulators by the attempt to secure limited liability in an OFC is appropriately situated in a history of patronage from the UK state which has enabled accountants to secure The UK state has a long history of sheltering capital through a variety of corporate, partnership and insolvency laws. The Limited Liability Act 1855 was a major development as it enabled entrepreneurs to limit their losses.
During the Victorian era, accountants tended to operate as sole traders and partnerships (Brown, 1905) , either because they were too small or found these structures most amenable for projecting an image of integrity, respectability and reliability, as well as providing a favourable basis of taxation. In the early twentieth century, there were debates about auditor , 1993) . This enabled auditors to argue that the negligence of other parties (e.g. directors, bankers) contributed to the damages suffered by plaintiffs and therefore that the damages against them should be correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, despite these concessions, major auditing firms wanted to minimize their responsibilities or 'exposure', and therefore campaigned for full proportional liability and a 'cap' (Likierman, 1989; Big Eight, 1994) .
Accounting Firms, Globalization and Offshore Financial Centres
By the early 1990s, some UK firms began considering the possibility of (Plender, 1990) .
Under the evolved constitutional arrangements, the UK government is responsible for their defence and international relations and ultimately for their "good government" (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 June 1998, cols. 471 and 465; 27 January 1997, col. 33).
In common with other states, Jersey can use its lawmaking powers to protect or privilege the position of elite groups -powers that extend not only to sheltering capital but also to enacting legislation intended to shield accounting firms from liability lawsuits. Since the 1960s, policies have been pursued to establish Jersey as an OFC as a means of supplementing its traditional economy based on agriculture and tourism (Hampton, 1996; Hampton and Abbott, 1999 Arnold and Sikka, 2001 ) complained that, "My experience with both Jersey and Guernsey has been that it has not been possible for US law enforcement to collect evidence and prosecute crime. In one case we tracked money from the Bahamas through Curacao, New York and London, but the paper trail stopped in Jersey and Guernsey ……. It is unseemly that these British dependencies should be acting as havens for transactions that would not even be protected by Swiss bank secrecy laws" (The Observer, 22 September 1996, p. 19) .
correspondently vulnerable to capital flight. Perversely, if also predictably, Jersey has found itself exposed to the very forces that, as a tax haven, it has sought successfully to harness. Jersey has, in some circles, acquired a reputation for offering its "legislature for hire" (Hampton and Christensen, 1999) . At any rate, it has sought to diversify its economy by offering LLP legislation with the hope that "its implementation in due course would encourage leading accounting and solicitors firms to be registered in Jersey …" (The Accountant, November 1996, p. 5).
Doing Business with an OFC
We have noted how the development of LLP legislation in Jersey was stimulated by the interest of UK based accounting firms rather than from any firm located in Jersey. The proposed legislation had to be scrutinized by the Jersey parliament whose institutional structures present their own challenges.
The 53 part-time members of Jersey's single chamber of parliament are directly elected by the public. Members of parliament meet for about 3-7 days a month and generally lack the organizational resources and political will to scrutinize the executive effectively. In the absence of political parties, it is extremely difficult to develop a coherent programme of reform let alone to subject the executive to close examination. The difficulties are compounded by weak local trade unions, a lack of pressure groups and a media that rarely questioned government policies. Indeed, until, the late 1990s, the Island's main newspaper, Jersey Evening Post, was owned by a leading politician.
Before 2005 (for an extended extract see Cousins et al., 2004, pp. 28-29) (Sikka, 2008b) . The level of secrecy surrounding the draft law was reflected in the way that Jersey's Law Society, which traditionally comments on draft laws, was initially denied the opportunity to comment, though subsequently it was given a very short period to do so.
On 21 In line with Jersey's normal legislative processes, senior politicians expected the Bill to be passed quickly and quietly. Unexpectedly, it encountered resistance and delay (see Cousins et al., 2004 and Sikka, 2008b (Sikka, 1996; Sikka, 2008b Committee told parliament that "At the time the law was passed, there were reasonable grounds for supposing that the registration of LLPs could bring substantial benefit to Jersey. In the event, despite the passage of the legislation, no LLP has been registered" (Jersey Evening Post, 29 November 2000). The Jersey 'sprat' had served its purpose now that the UK 'mackerel' had been landed.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The state is at once a powerful sponsor and a prime target of the dynamic forces of capitalism and globalisation. It underpins property rights, commands a monopoly of the means of violence and is at the centre of processes of contestation and settlement that are more or less conducive to capital retention, attraction and accumulation. The relationship between (fractions of) capital and the (elements of) the state is complex and certainly not fixed. In the UK, accounting firms and accounting bodies have been adept at mobilizing the state to secure and expand markets for their services and to shield them from critical public scrutiny relating to allegations of audit failures and money laundering (Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1998) . Not only are these firms and bodies formed `in the context of government regulation' but, as our case study of auditor liability has shown, they have continued to flourish in that context' (Hopwood, 1985: 13 
